Showing posts with label guru focus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label guru focus. Show all posts

Sunday, December 20, 2009

GURUFOCUS: Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway Just Fed Harley-Davidson Inc. Some Motor Oil

According to today�s press release, Harley Davidson (HOG) issued $600 million senior unsecured notes to fund its wholly owned finance company, Harley-Davidson Finance Service (HDFS). The note will be repaid in 2014 and the annual interest is 15%. Warren Buffett�s company Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A) (BRK.B) and Davis Selected Advisers, L.P. each snapped up $300 million.

Now, 15 percent per annum for a five-year note is a very high interest rate. This is how the CFO of the Harley Davidson, Thomas E. Bergmann, justified the move:

�This offering represents an important next step in executing our stated strategy for funding the lending activities of HDFS".

Impressive business talk, but it does not conceal the fact that one has to be in desperate need for the money to borrow under those terms.

The Borrowing Will Not Increase Profit

The borrowing probably won�t bring more earnings to the share holders in its life time of the next five years. What is the interest is Harley Davidson lending to its customers? 1% or 2%? So we are borrowing high and lending low. It doesn"t make sense to me.

According to GuruFocus data, HOG managed to make a little over 15% on its assets during boom years (2003-2007), but ROA has dropped to less than 10% at the end of 2008. 2009 will be another challenging year for the company. On January 23, 2009, the company announced that it saw for 2009 a reduction of 10-13% in motorcycle shipment and a shrinkage of gross margin to 30.5-31.5% from 34.5% in 2008. If the company couldn�t make more 15% on its assets (borrowed fund or equity), what is there left for share holders after paying the 15% in interest?

Harley Dividson Is Funding Its Own Sales

Instead, the loan has more to do with surviving in the current credit crunch. In the good old days, customers typically bought motorcycles from Harley Davidson Motor Cycle division; HDFS financed the purchases; HDFS turned around, securitized the loans and sold them to the Wall Street. Since 2008, �securitization� became a one of many dirty words and no one on Wall Street had much appetite for �securitized loans� of any kinds. As a result, in despite of declining revenue, HOG had to retain much more of the receivable on its balance sheet: its �Finance Receivable held for sale� more than tripled from $781 million at the end of 2007 to $2.4 billion at the end of 2008. In 2008, HOG resorted to short term borrowing and long term debt to fund this ballooned asset. Its short term liability increased from $1.9 billion to $2.6 billion; its debt increased from $980 million to $2.2 billion. The combine increase of $1.9 billion is compared to a total annual revenue of $5.6 billion, that is more than 33%.

Keeping more receivable on its balance sheet had its toll on HOG�s net income. In the final quarter of 2008, HDFS, its financing arm, had a $35.1 million write-down of retained securitization interests and a $28.4 million write-down to fair value of finance receivable held for sale. The $63 million write-down is significant compared to the quarterly net income of $77.8 million. The company wouldn�t retain so much receivable on its balance sheet if it had better choices.

Harley Dividson Has Been Credit Squeezed

It is worrisome to see its short term debt increase by $700 million. A typical loan for the motorcycles is for 5 to 7 years; apparently the company increased the short term borrowing in 2008 to financing the loans. Indeed, the company was squeezed to re-pay a $400 million mid-term note that matured in mid of December 2008. In the January 23, 2008 conference call, the company�s CFO Thomas E. Bergmann stated:

  • Turning to funding for HDFS, during last quarter"s conference call I explained specifically the options we had for repaying the $400 million of medium-terms notes that matured last December. Those options included accessing the unsecured debt capital market, utilizing our unsecured commercial paper program, and establishing an asset-backed commercial paper conduit facility.


  • We continued to access the commercial paper market throughout the quarter, including participation in the Fed"s CPSS program. By mid December it was clear that the unsecured term debt market was not accessible, so on December 12th we entered into a $500 million asset-backed commercial paper conduit facility. The funds generated from this facility were primarily used to repay the medium-term notes that matured in December.


  • In other words, the company borrowed short term to repay mid-term. Great band-aid corporate financing strategy.

    How Long Can $600 Million Last

    How long can the $600 million borrowed today from Warren Buffett�s Berkshire Hathaway and Davis Selected Advisers last? It looks like Harley needs to re-pay that $500 million asset-backed commercial paper mentioned above by March 31, 2009. Even if it can extend the terms for that loan, at the 2008 burning rate of $1.9 billion per year,, it won�t last for long unless the other options become available. In the fourth quarter conference call, CFO Thomas E. Bergmann stated:

  • To meet the remaining HDFS funding needs for 2009, we are pursuing three preferred paths. The first is for HDFS or Harley-Davidson, Inc., to access the unsecured debt capital market. We continue to carefully monitor these markets for opportunities.


  • The second preferred path is to seek to increase the $500 million asset-backed commercial paper conduit facility we entered into in December and extend the term beyond the March 31st maturity date. Expanding and extending this facility would supplement our existing unsecured commercial paper program.


  • And finally, we are working diligently to gain access to the asset-backed securitization market via the term asset-backed securities loan facility or TALF program. We are actively evaluating the program to further understand the details and learn how we may benefit from it. Retail motorcycle loans have been included as eligible assets in the program; however, exact details of the TALF program are not yet finalized. The general expectation is that the program will be clarified in the next few weeks.



  • Right now the TALF option seems to offer a more plausible mid-term solution. The Federal Reserve Board on November 25, 2008 announced the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), a facility that will help market participants meet the credit needs of households and small businesses by supporting the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). It is not fully functional yet, it remains to be seen how effective that might be.

    Why Not Cut Dividend?

    It is bewildering to try to rationalize the HOG management decision today: as near as December 9, 2008, Harley Davidson announced a quarterly dividend of $0.33 per share. That is $1.32 per year. With 232 million shares outstanding, the company is paying out a little over $300 million each year as dividend. Cut the dividend, don�t borrow from Warren Buffett at 15%! Berkshire Hathaway never paid a dividend, nor had it ever had to borrow at 15% interest.

    Bad For Harley Davidson, Good For Bershire Hathaway

    Apparenlty, HOG share holders considered it a great endorsement from Warren Buffett. HOG stock is up $1.87 (15.77%) today. Perhaps investors took it as a hint that it is Warren Buffett�s opinion that the company will survive the ecomonic crisis for at least another five years. Probably so, but much less profitably so. As a matter of fact, I think Warren Buffett just fed the thirsty Harley Davidson some motor oil. It tastes bad, it does not really stop the thirst. It is simply not a healthy drink.

    On the other hand, the 15% interest on $300 million is a good return for Berkshire Hathaway�s share holders.

    Go Berkshire Hathaway!

    Filed Under: BRK-A, HOG, BRK-B,


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    Wednesday, December 2, 2009

    GURUFOCUS: Berkshire Hathaway and Fairfax Financial Holdings Gaining From USG Debt to Stock Conversion

    Apr. 17, 2009 | Filed Under: USG , FFH , BRK-A , BRK-B



    On February 12, we reported that Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-A) headed by Warren Buffett and Fairfax Financial Holdings (FFH) Chaired by Prem Watsa obtained the right to acquire additional shares in the drywall company USG Corp. when the shareholders of USG approved the conversion of the $400 million debt into stock. The conversion price was reported to be $11.40.



    In addition, we reported Fairfax Financial Holdings bought 200,000 shares of USG in the open market at $5.24 per share on March 11, 2009. The current USG ownership of the two Investment Gurus is as follows:



    Ticker

    Guru Name

    Portfolio Date*

    Current Shares

    % of Shares Outstanding

    USG

    Prem Watsa

    2009-03-11

    7,311,500

    7.37

    USG

    Warren Buffett

    2009-02-09

    43,387,981

    43.75





    In 2009, the stock declined to a 52-week low of $4.16 in early March but has climbed since then. Today it rose above the conversion price of $11.40 at which Berkshire Hathaway and Fairfax Financial Holding gets their shares. Once again, Warren Buffett and Prem Watsa are making money for their shareholders.



    In the article mentioned above, we questioned how USG fits into the model of companies that Warren Buffett likes, given its declining revenue and earning trend, shrinking gross margin rate, and increasing debt. The Investment Gurus� high profile investing activity also invited heated discussion on the intrinsic value of USG in GuruFocus Forums, when the stock price fell around $5.



    Naturally, our users had a wide range of intrinsic value estimate of the company, from about one (1) billion dollars (about $8-12 per share) to greater than $5 billion or about $50 per share, however, the consensus was that at $5.00, USG represented a decent discount from its intrinsic value. In the Forum discussion, a question was raised by GuruFocus user mahmutpasha and he or she asked: �Should we trust Gurus on these � USG & UFS�. Here are two very insightful Forum posts, representing the two extremes of the intrinsic value estimate:



    The first post came from user buffetteer17:
    Take a look at tangible assets and free cash flow. USG has net value of $1,500M, or about $15/share. A lot of that is plant and equipment, $2,500M. Presumably a competitor would have to spend around this amount to set up an equivalent operation. So their sheer scale may give them somewhat of a moat. Over a full economic cycle, USG seems to average around $100-150M of free cash flow per year, but it is very lumpy. In the current environment they"re bleeding about $300M of cash per year.



    With 100M shares outstanding, they look to earn $1.00-$1.50 a share of free cash flow once the economy turns around, giving them a multiple of about 5x with the current share price of $5. If you use the 10x free cash flow rule of thumb, they ought to be worth $10-15/share. They have a lot of debt and who knows when or if they"ll return to profitability? Since there"s a housing and commerical property glut right now, I"d discount the value of the future free cash flow by a couple of year, say 20%, and estimate the intrinsic value at about $8-12/share.




    The second was by user batbeer2:
    I think USG has ~125 M shares outstanding and I think the debt is ~2.5 B (back to dec 2007 level) as opposed to the 100M and 3 B reported on many good sites ;-)



    I am not known on this forum for my impeccable calculations but based on your estimate of free cash flow lets call it a $ 10 stock.



    I work with a 15% cashflow yield; that implies ~6.5x cashflow multiple. That would make USG a ~$12 stock. So with those assumptions our valuation is more or less the same.



    Looking back you find years with ~ 5 B in revenue and a ~ 10% net margin. A 5B company. With 200 M shares that would be a $ 25 stock on a p/e of 10 if the world ever returns to normal. No asbestos and no deflating housing bubble. IMO USG is less cyclical than it is perceived to be. The stock has been all over the place, but revenue has not. Also, the price of wallboard is not directly related to the price of houses.



    All based on reasonable numbers for the past 10 years. Rearview mirror etc.



    IMO USG will be a far better company from 2010 on than it was at any point between 1998 and 2008. USG will have > 7 B of revenue and a > 15% net margin within 10 years. A 10 B company.

    With mr. Market being what he is, we just might be able to sell him the USG shares at $ 50.



    No matter how I look at it I cannot imagine a reasonable scenario where the investor today stands to loose money over the long term. My subjective, personal, murky windscreen valuation says this is a 10 B company. My worst case calculation says 2B. Market cap today is ~0.7B if you adjust for the number of shares outstanding.



    Sure, there are scenarios where the investor looses money

    1) WEB/Watsa stealing it private;

    2) bankruptcy filings and shareholders loosing out to creditors

    3) Another asbestos only this time it is not asbestos but some other hidden danger.

    4) Commercial realestate market gets much worse and more so than the housing market.



    I just don"t think those scenarios are reasonable.



    You will note WEB and Watsa are doing their bit to make sure #2 never happens.



    What I cannot understand is why WEB was buying > $ 50 but it sure helps.



    To me it is obvious that USG is a >> 5B company now trading <>Whether USG will proper and fetch a rich valuation in the market remains to be seen. To participate in the discuss, we at GuruFocus would like to throw in our two cents in the discussion by presenting this 10-year Valuation results that is only normally available to the premium members (7-day free trial available)







    According to the 10-year valuation tool, we can tell the USG stock price is at the low end as measured by P/E, P/B, P/S metrics.



    Users are encouraged to submit your question by posting a question in GuruFocus Forum! Chances are, it will be answered by a very insightful value investor.



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    Tuesday, November 24, 2009

    GURUFOCUS: Wells Fargo & Company: John Stumpf"s Letter to Shareholders Is a Must-Read

    Mar. 23, 2009 | Filed Under: WFC,



    Filed Under:
    WFC,



    It�s no secret I�m an aficionado of the letters to shareholders CEOs write every year for inclusion at the beginning of their companies� annual reports. They are a terrific opportunity for a CEO to step back from the day-to-day details of running his business to review the year just past, and to discuss the key issues and problems he sees ahead. (This doesn�t mean I think most CEO letters are actually good, by the way. Most aren�t. Still, there�s nothing like a leaden, clich�-ridden letter, full of self-serving blather explaining away a prior year�s lousy results to serve as a red flag that a given company figures to be a truly lousy investment.)



    Anyway, given the disruption the banking industry went through in 2008, I�ve been particularly looking forward to reading this year�s crop of letters. There�s a lot to be discussed, obviously. I�m interested to see which CEOs are truly candid and insightful about what went on, and which take excuse-making and scapegoating to new heights.



    It�s early yet, but, so far, I�ve been disappointed. Even the gold standard among CEO letters, the one Warren Buffett writes every year to holders of Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A), didn�t get into many big issues or discuss the future the way I�d hoped. (I would have liked to read Buffett�s thoughts on the rating agencies, for instance, given Berkshire�s stake in Moody�s (MCO).) I�m definitely looking forward to reading what Jamie Dimon (JPM) has to say. And Bob Wilmers of M&T Bank (MTB), as well. The best letter so far, though, comes from John Stumpf at Wells Fargo (WFC).



    I strongly encourage you to read the Wells letter, but not because Stumpf provides any blazing macro insights. That�s not Wells�s game. Rather, Stumpf�s letter is worthwhile because it explains in plain English the principles that make Wells Fargo not just a great banking organization but one of America�s great companies. (And yes, to all you corporate bashers out there, there are still a number of great companies around!) Here are some highlights:



    Management keeps it simple. Wells Fargo is a huge organization, both geographically and as measured by the number of banking products it offers. Yet the company is successful largely because, despite its size, it nonetheless manages to keep things simple. If Wells doesn�t understand a product (an option ARM, say) it simply won�t offer it. Stumpf notes that the Wells Fargo vision does not require any complex mathematical models. Tell that to the guys in the financial products division of AIG!



    Management is honest. Candid admission of error in CEO letters is rare, yet right up front, Stumpf concedes, �We made some mistakes but kept our credit discipline.� Nor does Stumpf sugarcoat his outlook for the future. �If you�re a pessimist, there�s a lot for you to like about 2009,� he writes. �It will be a rough year for our economy and our industry. Consumer loans will continue under stress, chargeoffs [uncollectible debt] probably will continue to rise.� Contrast that with what you�ll read in letters from banks that lost money in 2008 (which Wells Fargo did not.) You�d never guess they�re buried under problem loans! Wells Fargo is not in denial.



    The company wants to build value, not an empire. In 2008, Wells Fargo doubled its assets with the acquisition of Wachovia. But in discussing the deal, Stumpf emphasizes that Wells didn�t do it simply to bulk up. �Size alone means nothing to us,� he writes. Then Stumpf repeats a mantra coined more than a decade ago by his predecessor, Dick Kovacevich: �You don�t get better by getting bigger, you get bigger by getting better�. Somebody please tell that to AIG, Bank of America, and Citigroup!



    Management is truly focused on its teammates. In most shareholder letters, CEOs feel the need to buck up the rank and file with some gratuitous comment that �our employees are our greatest asset� or �our people are our greatest competitive strength.� They don�t mean a word of it, of course. Wells Fargo does. The company has long believed it can differentiate itself with superior employee performance; the record of the last 20 years shows that it can�and has. Stumpf writes, �we call them team members (an asset in which to invest), not employees (an expense to be managed).� At Wells, that investment has paid off. According to survey data gathered by Gallup, Wells Fargo�s community banking group has 8.7 team members who say they�re engaged in their work for each team member that�s actively disengaged. This compares with 2.5 engaged-to-disengaged team members five years ago, and a national average of 1.5 to 1. I believe the deep commitment of Wells�s employees is a key factor in the company�s long-term success.



    Management is focused on serving costumers. If you read the letter, you can�t help but be impressed with Stumpf�s authentic emphasis on customer service. Wells�s management is proud of the customer experience the company delivered last year. At the same time, Wells knows service levels are a long way from perfect; Stumpf is honest in saying so.



    Management is focused on the integration of Wachovia. You might remember that when the Wells Fargo-Norwest merger happened in 1998, management laid out an integration plan that was slated to go more slowly than most other bank-merger integrations of the era. Norwest-Wells management took some heat over the perceived delays. But in the end, Wells Fargo was the only one of the dozen big deals of the time to achieve its earnings objectives in the following two years. The other eleven, meanwhile, missed their initial earnings projections by an average of 13%! Their haste led to service glitches and revenue erosion. By contrast, Wells�s first priority was holding the franchise together and avoiding merger disruption. Stumpf makes it clear that the company is approaching the Wachovia integration the same way it went about integrating Wells Fargo with Norwest. I expect it will have similar success.



    Congratulations to John Stumpf for writing an informative letter in plain English. I continue to hope (and wish) to read more that are this good.



    Thomas Brown

    www.bankstocks.com



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